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The key issue in a trademark infringement case is whether the
contested mark creates a likelihood of confusion with a previously
used or registered mark.' The federal courts of appeals generally
agree on the factors to be considered in determining- whether a
likelihood of confusion exists. The appellate courts disagree, how-
ever, on whether a lower court's determination of the likelihood of
confusion should be treated as a question of fact, upheld unless
clearly erroneous, or as a question of law, reviewable de novo.
The Second, Sixth, and Federal Circuits view the issue as a
mixed question of law and fact. They treat the determination of
the likelihood of confusion as a question of law reviewable de novo,
while according clearly erroneous review to the specific findings on
which the determination was based.2 The Ninth Circuit also de-
fines likelihood of confusion as a mixed question of law and fact
but accords clearly erroneous review to all aspects of the inquiry.3
The remaining circuits define the likelihood of confusion inquiry as
a question of pure fact subject to clearly erroneous review.4
t B.A. 1989, University of Wisconsin, Madison; J.D. 1992, The University of Chicago.
I See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v Maier Brewing Co., 314 F2d 149 (9th Cir 1963).
As defined by the Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1127 (1992):
[t]he term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination
thereof-(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in
commerce and applies to register on the principle register established by this Act, to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manu-
factured or sold by others and to indicate the source of goods, even if that source is
unknown.
The Lanham Act protects "marks," which "includes any trademark, service mark, collective
mark, or certification mark." Id. In this Comment, the terms "mark" and "trademark" en-
compass the marks protected by the Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1114(1) (1992), and false desig-
nations of origin prohibited by the Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1125(a) (1992).
2 See notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
See notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
4 See notes 36-37, 40-45 and accompanying text.
1291
The University of Chicago Law Review
This Comment argues that likelihood of confusion is a mixed
question of law and fact that should be treated as a factual issue
for review purposes. The trial court, as fact finder, is best situated
to determine the likelihood of confusion issue, the crucial question
in a trademark infringment case. Thus, appellate courts should re-
view likelihood of confusion determinations under a clearly errone-
ous standard. Section I explores the fact-driven nature of the in-
quiry by examining the factors and evidence courts use to
determine likelihood of confusion issues. Section II analyzes ex-
isting review standards and the rationales for these standards. Sec-
tion III explains why the likelihood of confusion inquiry is a mixed
question of law and fact and discusses the difficulties courts have
in determining the review standard appropriate for a mixed ques-
tion. This Section also considers the problems that result from the
absence of a uniform review standard. Section IV concludes that
treating likelihood of confusion as a factual issue for review pur-
poses is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, and finds
support in the treatment of two analogous determinations in other
areas of law. Adoption of a uniform review standard will promote
judicial accuracy and efficiency, discourage forum shopping, and
end the confusion over likelihood of confusion.
I. THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION INQUIRY
As part of the law of unfair competition, trademark infringe-
ment is a business tort.5 Because trademarks assist consumers in
identifying products and allow producers to control the reputation
of their products, trademarks are assets, part of a business's good-
will.6 The first producer to adopt a mark that distinguishes its
products from another producer's has a legally enforceable right to
that mark's exclusive use.' To prevail on an infringement claim, a
plaintiff must establish that its mark distinguishes its product
from that of another, and that the defendant's mark is likely to
cause confusion.8 Likelihood of confusion is the test of infringment
See Keebler Co. v Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F2d 366, 372 (1st Cir 1980). See also
United Drug v Rectanus Co., 248 US 90, 97 (1918). The tort is based on the premise "that
one merchant shall not divert customers from another by representing what he sells as ema-
nating from the second." Yale Electric Corp. v Robertson, 26 F2d 972, 973 (2d Cir 1928).
' See Scandia Down Corp. v Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F2d 1423, 1429-30 (7th Cir 1985).
7 See United Drug, 248 US at 100. The party seeking damages, usually the senior user
of the mark, has standing to sue because the senior user has "quasi-property rights" in the
mark. See Bonito Boats v Thunder Craft Boats, 489 US 141, 157 (1989).
8 See 15 USC §§ 1114(1), 1125(a).
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(1) in federal court actions involving federally registered marks9
and unregistered marks and trade dress protectable under the
Lanham Act;10 (2) in state court actions involving marks or trade
dress protectable at state common law and marks registered with
state authorities; and (3) by the Patent and Trademark Office in
registration-related proceedings.11
A. The Ordinarily Prudent Purchaser Standard
Likelihood of confusion exists when "an appreciable number
of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed
simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question.' 2 The
word "likely" is key; a party must establish that consumer confu-
sion is probable, not inevitable. 3 The trier of fact should inquire
whether ordinary consumers, buying with ordinary caution, are
likely to be misled in their general recollection of the marks, 4 not
whether the marks are similar when compared side-by-side. In
other words, "the marks must be compared in the light of what
occurs in the marketplace, not in the courtroom."' 5
B. Evidentiary Factors Used in Determining Likelihood of
Confusion
Because more than the marks themselves are relevant to likeli-
hood of confusion determinations, courts look to a number of other
considerations.' Although each circuit has its own variant of the
9 15 USC § 1114(1)(a). See also Fleischmann, 314 F2d at 151-52.
10 15 USC § 1125(a). See also Scandia Down, 772 F2d at 1423 (applies test to unregis-
tered mark). Trade dress refers to a product's packaging, labeling, or design, Stormy Clime
Ltd. v Progroup, Inc., 809 F2d 971, 974 (2d Cir 1987), and is protectable if it "has acquired
a secondary meaning by which it is identified with its producer or source." LeSportsac, Inc.
v K Mart Corp., 754 F2d 71, 75 (2d Cir 1985).
" 15 USC § 1052(d). The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) may refuse to register a
mark or may cancel the registration of a mark if likelihood of confusion exists with a previ-
ously registered or used mark. See 15 USC §§ 1063, 1064. PTO decisions on registration or
cancellation can be appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), an admin-
istrative tribunal. TTAB decisions can be reviewed by appeal to the Federal Circuit or by a
civil action in an appropriate United States District Court. 15 USC § 1071.
" Perini Corp. v Perini Construction, Inc., 915 F2d 121, 127 (4th Cir 1990), quoting
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F2d 44, 47 (2d Cir 1978).
3 Eclipse Assoc., Ltd. v Data General Corp., 894 F2d 1114, 1118-19 (9th Cir 1990).
14 See Country Floors, Inc. v Gepner, 930 F2d 1056, 1064 (3d Cir 1991).
"I Amoco Oil Company v Rainbow Snow, Inc., 809 F2d 656, 662 (10th Cir 1987).
10 This Comment focuses on the kinds of trademark disputes that are likely to reach
the appellate level. Usually, if a competitor uses a mark that is identical or nearly identical
to a plaintiff's mark, "the court need rarely look beyond the mark itself..., the court will
generally examine the registered mark . . . and compare it against the challenged mark."
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precise set of factors the trier of fact should consider,17 these lists
all derive from the Restatement of Torts.' 8
The factors generally include, at a minimum: (1) the similarity
of the marks;' 9 (2) similarities between the goods or services; (3)
the likely degree of purchaser care; (4) the strength of the plain-
tiff's mark in the marketplace;20 (5) the defendant's intent; and (6)
incidents of actual confusion. Depending on the case and the cir-
cuit, these evidentiary factors may also include: the degree to
which the products share common purchasers; similarities between
the parties' advertising and marketing channels; and, if the goods
are related but do not directly compete with one another, the like-
lihood that the senior user will expand so as to compete directly
Interpace Corp. v Lapp, Inc., 721 F2d 460, 462 (3d Cir 1983). Such "open and shut" cases
do not involve lengthy litigation to determine liability and rarely, if ever, reach the appeals
courts. See Opticians Association of America v Independent Opticians of America, 920 F2d
187, 195 (3d Cir 1990). Thus, the following discussion of evidentiary factors and their use
applies, for example, to disputes over marks on used goods that do not directly compete
with one another or marks that are similar but not identical.
17 See, for example, Polaroid Corp. v Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F2d 492, 495 (2d
Cir 1961); Giant Food, Inc. v Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F2d 1565, 1569-71 (Fed Cir
1983).
," See Restatement of Torts §§ 729, 731 (1939). The Restatement articulates a set of
factors for infringement claims involving marks used on directly competing goods in § 729,
and a more elaborate set of factors for use in the context of infringement claims concerning
marks used on goods that are related, but do not directly compete with one another in
§ 731. However, courts tend to overlook this distinction and use one set of evidentiary fac-
tors for both types of claims. See, for example, Charles of the Ritz Group v Quality King
Distributors, 832 F2d 1317, 1318, 1321-23 (2d Cir 1987). The Restatement (Second) omits
all sections on unfair competition. The ALI council decided that it is no longer appropriate
to include the area in the Restatement of Torts since unfair competition is largely an inde-
pendent body of law. 8 Restatement (Second) of Torts 1-2 (1979).
19 To make a finding on this issue, a court may consider the degree of similarity be-
tween the designation and the trademark or trade name in (a) appearance, (b) pronuncia-
tion of the words used, (c) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved, and (d)
suggestion. Restatement of Torts § 729. But in doing so, "a court must.look to the overall
impression created by the marks and not merely compare individual features." General
Mills, Inc. v Kellogg Co., 824 F2d 622, 627 (8th Cir 1987).
'0 A trier of fact will first consider the degree to which the mark is distinctive. A mark
consisting of a fanciful term (for example, KODAK) is inherently distinctive and is pre-
sumed to be strong within the relevant market. However, if the mark is a descriptive term
(for example, AUTO PAGE) a trier of fact must determine whether it has acquired distinc-
tiveness or, secondary meaning, through use. 15 USC § 1052(f). A mark consisting of a sug-
gestive term (for example, TIDE) hints at a characteristic of the good and requires the
consumer to use some degree of imagination to determine the good's nature. A trier of fact
must determine, however, whether the mark is truly suggestive or whether it is descriptive
and requires proof of secondary meaning. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 873 F2d 985, 991-92 (7th Cir 1989). A mark's strength may be increased by "extensive
advertising, length of time in the market, public recognition, and uniqueness." Century 21
Real Estate Corp. v Sandlin, 846 F2d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir 1988).
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with the alleged infringer.21 Regardless of the formulation used,
the factors "imply no mathematical precision," and a plaintiff need
not prevail on all, or even most, of the factors to prevail overall.22
C. The Use of Law and Fact in the Judicial Determination of
Likelihood of Confusion
Although a court's finding on the similarity of two marks may
be based on a subjective judgment, the inquiries into factors other
than similarity entail objective fact-finding that can be supported
by evidence. Judicial findings on these factors can draw inferences
from testimonial, documentary, and survey evidence, as well as ex-
hibits, expert witnesses, and other sources. 23 For example, to deter-
mine a mark's strength, a court might consider evidence detailing
the use of the mark, including sales and advertising information
and testimony from representative consumers.24 Similarly, to de-
termine or infer a defendant's intent in selecting a mark, courts
may use evidence concerning the process by which the mark was
selected and the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's mark.25
To establish actual confusion, a plaintiff may introduce com-
munications suggesting confusion, such as records of telephone
conversations, mail received, and inquiries of retailers and consum-
ers.26 A plaintiff may also present oral testimony of actual confu-
sion.27 In addition, litigants are increasingly using market re-
search-reaction tests or surveys indicating the response of a
21 See Yale Electric Corp. v Robertson, 26 F2d 972, 973-74 (2d Cir 1928) (YALE flash-
lights and batteries create a likelihood of confusion with YALE locks).
22 See Wynn Oil Co. v Thomas, 839 F2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir 1988). A number of appel-
late courts require the trial court to consider all of the circuit's factors before denying or, in
some cases, awarding a plaintiff relief. See, for example, Volkswagenwerk v Wheeler, 814
F2d 812, 817 (1st Cir 1987); Sun-Fun Products v Suntan Research & Development, 656 F2d
186, 189 (5th Cir 1981). The Eleventh Circuit expects the lower court to consider all the
factors "relevant" to the dispute. Wesco Mfg., Inc. v Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach,
Inc., 833 F2d 1484, 1489 (11th Cir 1987). However, the Ninth and Second Circuits do not
require the lower court to review a specific list of factors in every case. See Eclipse Assoc.,
894 F2d at 1118; Orient Express Trading Co. v Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 842 F2d 650,
654 (2d Cir 1988).
2 See Rudolf Callmann, 3A The Law of Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monop-
olies §§ 20.63, 20.63.05 (Callaghan 1988).
2, See Dieter v B & H Industries of Southwest Florida, 880 F2d 322, 326-27 (11th Cir
1989).
25 See Sands, Taylor & Wood v The Quaker Oats Co., 18 USPQ2d 1457, 1471-72 (N D
Ill 1990).
2 See International Kennel Club v Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F2d 1079, 1082 (7th Cir
1988).
2 See Jockey International, Inc. v Burkard, 185 USPQ 201, 205 (S D Cal 1975).
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relevant group of consumers to a particular mark-to demonstrate
the existence or absence of a likelihood of confusion.28
A likelihood of confusion determination requires a court to
consider whether the "totality of circumstances, '29 the entirety of
the findings on the evidentiary factors,"° meets the legal standard
of whether potential purchasers of the product are likely to be con-
fused. To reach a conclusion, a trier of fact, using the ordinary pur-
chaser construct as a guide, weighs and balances the findings in
accordance with the circumstances of the particular infringement
and the context of the mark's use.
II. ExiSTING STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Justice White has noted that the federal circuit courts have
split over the question of "whether a district court's finding of a
likelihood of confusion in a trademark infringement matter under
[the Lanham Act] is reviewable under the 'clearly erroneous' stan-
dard, as a finding of fact, or de novo, as a conclusion of law. 3 1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 52(a) mandates that find-
ings of fact may be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous.32
Courts review conclusions of law de novo. Where, however, a deter-
mination is neither a question of pure fact 3 nor clearly a question
of law,34 an appellate court must decide whether to treat it as law
28 See, for example, Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v Novak, 836 F2d 397, 400-01 (8th Cir
1987).
29 Schwinn Bicycle Co. v Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F2d 1176, 1184 (7th Cir 1989).
10 No single factor alone is determinative. Piper Aircraft Corp. v Wag-Aero, Inc., 741
F2d 925, 934 (7th Cir 1984). The similarity of the marks, the defendant's intent, and actual
confusion are frequently considered to be more important than the other factors. See
Henri's Food Products Co. v Kraft, Inc., 717 F2d 352, 354 (7th Cir 1983). But neither
wrongful intent nor evidence of actual confusion is necessary for likelihood of confusion to
exist. Century 21, 846 F2d at 1178.
3 McMonagle v Northeast Women's Center, Inc., 493 US 901, 904 (1989) (White dis-
senting from denial of certiorari).
32 The pertinent provision, FRCP 52(a), states: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
"2 Questions of fact, often termed historical facts, generally encompass inquires about
who, what and-where and can be made by persons ignorant of the applicable law. See
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum L Rev 229, 235 (1985). A ques-
tion of fact is "an issue involving the resolution of a factual dispute . Black's Law
Dictionary, 1246 (West, 6th ed 1990).
14 A question of law is "an issue which involves the application or interpretation of a
law .... Black's Law Dictionary at 1246.
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or fact for purposes of review."5 Disagreements over which stan-
dard of review applies to likelihood of confusion. determinations
arise because the inquiry implicates legal principles and is highly
fact dependent.
A. Clearly Erroneous Review
The federal circuit courts that treat likelihood of confusion as
a question of fact reverse a lower court's findings on any of the
evidentiary factors and its ultimate determination of the likelihood
of confusion only where they are clearly erroneous.38 Most of these
appellate courts define likelihood of confusion as a question of
pure fact.37 The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, defines likelihood of
confusion as a mixed question of law and fact, but nevertheless
treats it as a question of fact for review purposes,38 so that appel-
late review in" the Ninth Circuit is the same as in the circuits that
define the issue as a question of pure fact. The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, has provided more explicit and thorough policy and analyti-
cal rationales for clearly erroneous review than have other circuits
applying that standard. 9
1. Justifications for classifying likelihood of confusion as a
question of pure fact.
Nine circuits define likelihood of confusion as a question of
pure fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of FRCP
52(a). 40 In Scandia Down Corp. v Euroquilt, Inc., the Seventh Cir-
11 See Levi Strauss & Co. v Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F2d 1352, 1355-56 (9th Cir 1985) (en
banc) (if likelihood of confusion is treated as a question of fact, clearly erroneous review is
appropriate).
"8 The clearly erroneous rule does not apply if the trial judge commits an error of law.
See Pullman-Standard v Swint, 456 US 273, 287 (1982). If the trial court commits legal
error in a likelihood of confusion case, the appellate court will either review the record de
novo, see, for example, Forum Corp. of North America v Forum, Ltd., 903 F2d 434, 438, 443
(7th Cir 1990), or will remand, see, for example, Wesco Mfg. v Tropical Attractions of Palm
Beach, 833 F2d 1484, 1489 (11th Cir 1987).
" See Keds Corp. v Renee International Trading Corp., 888 F2d 215, 222 (1st Cir
1989); American Home Products Corp. v Barr Laboratories, Inc., 834 F2d 368, 370 (3d Cir
1987); Pizzeria Uno v Temple, 747 F2d 1522, 1526 (4th Cir 1984); Marathon Mfg. Co. v
Enerlite Products Corp., 767 F2d 214, 217 (5th Cir 1985); Scandia Down, 772 F2d at 1428;
Mutual of Omaha, 836 F2d at 398; Amoco Oil, 809 F2d at 661-62; Safeway Stores, Inc. v
Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F2d 1160, 1164 (11th Cir 1982); Reader's Digest Associa-
tion, Inc. v Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F2d 800, 804 (DC Cir 1987).
11 See Levi Strauss, 778 F2d at 1355-56. See also E.& J. Gallo Winery v Gallo Cattle
Co., 955 F2d 1327, 1338 (9th Cir 1992).
'" See Levi Strauss, 778 F2d at 1355-56.
40 See notes 32, 37.
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cuit stated, as an irrefutable presumption, that likelihood of confu-
sion is "all fact and no law," and articulated the advantages of
clearly erroneous review."' The court explained that although it
could examine the marks as the lower court did, the question is
whether the marks look similar to consumers, not whether the
marks look similar to judges.42 Noting that the district judge had
heard evidence on "how ordinary consumers perceive the marks"
and reviewed evidence of actual confusion, the court concluded
that de novo review of the lower court's conclusion would displace
the fact finder's role.43 Similarly, the First Circuit reasoned that a
finding of likelihood of confusion "quite clearly call[s] upon the
[district] court's 'experience with the mainsprings of human
conduct.' ,"'
The position adopted by these courts rests on the assumption
that the trier of fact, as the decisionmaker most familiar with the
evidence, is in the superior position to assess the likelihood of con-
fusion.45 However, although this rationale supports deferential re-
view, it fails to explain why the likelihood of confusion inquiry is
"all fact and no law."
2. Justifications for applying the clearly erroneous standard.
FRCP 52(a) compels clearly erroneous review of questions of
pure fact. However, one circuit that does not view likelihood of
confusion as a pure question of fact has nonetheless concluded that
clearly erroneous review is appropriate. In Levi Strauss & Co. v
Blue Bell, Inc.,46 the Ninth Circuit defined likelihood of confusion
as a mixed question of fact and law. However, the court concluded
that the issue is predominately one of fact, and applied the clearly
erroneous standard.4 7 The court treated the issue as factual for re-
view purposes because it does not implicate constitutional rights48
and "the applicable legal standard provides for a strictly factual
41 772 F2d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir 1985).
42 Id.
41 Id at 1429.
44 Keebler, 624 F2d at 377, quoting Commissioner v Duberstein, 363 US 278, 289
(1960).
4' Keds Corp., 888 F2d at 222; Amoco Oil, 809 F2d at 661-62; Scandia Down, 772 F2d
at 1429.
4" 778 F2d 1352 (9th Cir 1985) (en banc).
47 Id at 1355-56. The clearly erroneous rule, however, does not apply if the district
court used a incorrect legal test or misapplied the law. Clamp Mfg. Co. v Enco Mfg. Co., 870
F2d 512, 514 (9th Cir 1989).
48 See text accompanying notes 103-112.
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test."49 Further, the need for de novo review is reduced because
likelihood of confusion determinations, each of which stands upon
its own facts, have limited value as precedent.50 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that clearly erroneous review would prevent appellate
resources from being diverted to a task that properly belongs to
triers of fact. 1
B. De Novo Review
The Second, Sixth, and Federal Circuits review likelihood of
confusion determinations in two steps.52 First, they review the
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Second,
they review de novo the legal question whether the facts as found
by the lower court constitute a likelihood of confusion.54
No court has articulated a convincing justification for this
two-step review. The Second Circuit's adherence to de novo review
appears to be based on the belief that the appellate court is in as
good a position as the trial court to determine whether likelihood
of confusion exists. The Federal Circuit seemingly adopted de novo
review because its predecessor, the Court of Custom and Patent
Appeals (CCPA.), employed it. 5 5 The predecessor court's only ex-
planation for de novo review, however, was that the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board's (TTAB) determination of likelihood of
confusion "is a legal conclusion" that cannot be admitted as a
fact."
When the Sixth Circuit adopted de novo review, it said only
that it agreed with the Ninth Circuit's two-level test for reviewing
' 778 F2d at 1355.
Id at 1356.
5' Id at 1355.
See, for example, Centaur Communications v AISIM Communications, 830 F2d
1217, 1225 (2d Cir 1987); Wynn Oil Co. v American Way Service Corp., 943 F2d 595, 599
(6th Cir 1991) (Wynn Oil II); Electronic Design & Sales, Inc. v Electronic Data Systems
Corp., 954 F2d 713, 715 (Fed Cir 1992). The Federal Circuit employs this two-step review
process when hearing appeals from the TTAB. When it hears appeals from a district court
decision, it applies the review standard of the controlling circuit. See note 83 and accompa-
nying text.
" The Second Circuit even reviews de novo the finding on the similarity of the marks
because "an appellate court is in as good a position to evaluate this factor as is a trial
court." Centaur Communications, 830 F2d at 1226.
W ynn Oil 11, 943 F2d at 599; Electronic Design, 954 F2d at 715.
• See Giant Food, 710 F2d at 1569 ("it is clear that our predecessor court did not
apply the 'clearly erroneous' standard of review to the issue"). The decisions of the Court of
Custom and Patent Appeals are binding upon the Federal Circuit. South Corp. v United
States, 690 F2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed Cir 1982).
" Interstate Brands Corp. v Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 576 F2d 926, 929 (CCPA 1978).
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likelihood of confusion determinations, 57 an approach that the
Ninth Circuit has since abandoned.58 The Ninth Circuit had re-
viewed likelihood of confusion determinations de novo because the
determination "partakes more of the character of a conclusion of
law than of a finding of fact. The inference [of likelihood of confu-
sion is] 'derived from application of a legal standard.' "5 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[w]hen a finding is essentially one
dealing with the effect of certain transactions or events, rather
than a finding which resolves disputed facts, the appellate court
• . . is free to draw its own conclusions," 60 because it is "in as good
a position as the trial judge to determine the probability of
confusion."
6 1
Although the appellate courts that employ de novo review
have not explained why likelihood of confusion should be treated
as a question of law, their adherence to de novo review may be
based on their belief that the phrase "likely to cause confusion,"
presents a question of law. Because the question focuses on
whether the established factual situation meets the legal standard
of the likelihood of confusion, courts treat the issue as legal rather
than factual.
The inquiry, however, is highly fact-specific, despite its sus-
ceptibility to characterization as a question of law. The courts'
classification of the issue as a legal question might rest on the be-
lief that a conclusion regarding the likelihood of confusion goes be-
yond "the application of those ordinary principles of logic and
common experience." '62 The determination may be said to tran-
scend pure fact because the legal standard dictates that courts are
to consider certain factors before reaching a conclusion. 3 The de-
termination may then be said to merit plenary review because an
' Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v Elby's Big Boy, 670 F2d 642, 651 (6th Cir 1982).
" The Ninth Circuit abandoned this two-step approach after reconsidering the issue
and concluding that the issue is primarily factual and that clearly erroneous review would
permit better utilization of appellate resources. See text accompanying notes 46-51.
" Fleischmann, 314 F2d at 152, quoting Lundgren v Freeman, 307 F2d 104, 115 (9th
Cir 1962).
00 314 F2d at 152 n 2, quoting Stevenot v Norberg, 210 F2d 615, 619 (9th Cir 1954).
6, 314 F2d at 152, quoting Miles Shoes, Inc. v R.H. Macy & Co., 199 F2d 602, 602-03
(9th Cir 1952).
02 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
Euroquilt, Inc. v Scandia Down Corp., No 85-1038 (October Term, 1985) at 9 (on file with
U Chi L Rev), citing Bose Corp. v Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 US 485, 501
n 17 (1984).
03 Id at 9-10.
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appellate court has a responsibility to ensure that the lower court
has correctly applied the legal standard.
III. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CIRCUITS
This Section explains why likelihood of confusion is a mixed
question of law and fact and why the federal circuit courts have
been unable to agree upon the appropriate standard of review.
This Section also discusses the problems that arise from the ab-
sence of a uniform review standard.
A. Why Likelihood of Confusion is a Mixed Question
In Pullman-Standard, Division of Pullman v Swint, the Su-
preme Court distinguished between questions of pure fact and
mixed questions of law and fact.6 4 While the Court held that ap-
pellate courts may not review questions of pure fact de novo to
determine whether the facts satisfy a legal standard, the court ex-
pressly left open the question whether FRCP 52(a) compelled a
similar result for mixed questions.6 5 The Court defined mixed
questions as those inquiries "in which the historical facts are ad-
mitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue
is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it an-
other way, whether the rule of law is or is not violated."6
Likelihood of confusion inquiries require a court to identify
facts, articulate the legal standard, and apply law to fact.6 7 A court
must determine, based on the totality of circumstances, "whether
the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not vio-
lated. ' '6 8 Moreover, because evidence of actual confusion is fre-
quently unavailable, courts must infer from the facts whether "an
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to
be . . confused . *."..69 Thus, the inquiry here focuses on
whether the defendant's use of a mark meets this legal standard.
64 456 US 273, 279 (1982) (discriminatory intent under Title VII is a question of pure
fact).
65 Id at 289-90 and n 19.
11 Id at 289 n 19.
67 See United States v McConney, 728 F2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir 1984) (en banc) (articu-
lating three steps in deciding mixed questions of law and fact). See also Levi Strauss, 778
F2d at 1355-56 (Ninth Circuit relying on McConney in treating likelihood of confusion as a
factual issue on review). See generally Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Pro-
cess: Basic Problems in Making and Application of the Law 374-76 (unpublished tentative
ed 1958).
68 Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 289 n 19.
69 Perini Corp., 915 F2d at 127.
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B. Why Disagreement Exists: Problems Inherent in Determining
the Appropriate Review Standard
Because likelihood of confusion is a mixed question, appellate
courts find it particularly difficult to agree upon the appropriate
review standard. These difficulties, inherent in the nature of mixed
questions, are compounded by the problems courts have had his-
torically in distinguishing between law and fact in trademark cases.
The Supreme Court has long recognized "the vexing nature of
the distinctions between questions of fact and questions of law." 0
Although a court may avoid the dilemma of drawing a distinction
between law and fact by classifying a particular determination as a
mixed question, a court must still decide whether the mixed ques-
tion should be treated as law or fact for review purposes.71 Estab-
lished rules for making such decisions are lacking; the Court has
yet to arrive at "a rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish
a factual finding from a legal conclusion." '72 As a result, the deci-
sion to treat an issue as law or fact "is sometimes as much a matter
of allocation of judicial resources as it is of analysis. ' 73
In trademark law, courts have had particular difficulty in dis-
tinguishing between law and fact.74 Thus, the continuing disagree-
ment as to whether likelihood of confusion is, or should be, treated
as law or fact for review purposes is hardly surprising. Although
the existence of disagreement is understandable, a uniform review
standard has several advantages over the status quo.
C. The Need for a Uniform Standard
The absence of a uniform review standard causes a number of
problems. The objective of the Lanham Act was to create a na-
tional system for the protection of trademarks against infringe-
ment.75 The existing division over the proper standard of appellate
review of the key issue in trademark infringement claims under-
mines this objective. The outcome of an appeal can depend on
what standard of review the court applies to the likelihood of con-
70 Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 288.
7' Bose Corp., 466 US at 501.
72 Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 288.
"' Miller v Fenton, 474 US 104, 113-14 (1985).
7' See Union National Bank, Laredo v Union National Bank, Austin, 909 F2d 839, 846
(5th Cir 1990).
11 This national system of trademark protection is to facilitate interstate commerce,
prevent unfair competition, and prevent consumer fraud and deception. See 15 USC § 1127.
1302 [59:1291
Trademark Law
fusion issue.76 Furthermore, the absence of a uniform standard cre-
ates uncertainty and confusion among practitioners and judges
about the state of the law. 7
Moreover, the lack of a uniform standard has encouraged fo-
rum shopping. Because the Federal Circuit has non-exclusive juris-
diction over appeals from the TTAB, a party contesting a TTAB
decision may either appeal to the Federal Circuit or may file a civil
action in an appropriate federal district court. However, an adverse
party can prevent an appeal to the Federal Circuit by filing a civil
action in a district court.78
Although these civil actions have been termed trial de novo, a
district court must accept the findings of the TTAB "unless the
contrary is established by testimony which in character and
amount carries thorough conviction. 1 79 In terms of burdens of
proof on an appellant, the thorough conviction standard closely re-
sembles clearly erroneous review. 0 District courts reviewing the
TTAB record defer "to the lower tribunal's findings and reverse
only if there is clear error in fact or error in law." ' The Federal
Circuit, however, reviews de novo the TTAB's finding of likelihood
of confusion."2
As a result, a litigant seeking reversal of a TTAB decision has
a much greater burden of persuasion in a district court than in the
Federal Circuit. A party who disputes the TTAB's decision may be
inclined to appeal to the Federal Circuit for a de novo determina-
tion of the likelihood of confusion while the prevailing party will
have a strong incentive to force dismissal of that appeal by filing a
civil action in a district court (especially in a circuit that applies
the clearly erroneous standard).8 3 The divergence between the Fed-
6 See, for example, Squirto v Seven-Up Co., 628 F2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir 1980).
7' Uncertainty over the appropriate review standard can take the form of confusion
within a single opinion as well as confusion within a single circuit. For example, in Life
Technologies v Gibbco Scientific, 826 F2d 775 (8th Cir 1987), the Eighth Circuit stated that
likelihood of confusion is a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard yet
employed a less deferential standard to the district court's likelihood of confusion determi-
nation. Id at 776-77. Further, the Ninth Circuit adopted the clearly erroneous standard in
Levi Strauss, but a panel subsequently stated that the circuit reviews the conclusion of
likelihood of confusion de novo. See Miss World (UK) Ltd. v Mrs. America Pageants, Inc.,
856 F2d 1445, 1448 (9th Cir 1988).
71 See generally 15 USC § 1071(a), (b).
7' Morgan v Daniels, 153 US 120, 125 (1894).
80 Fregeau v Mossinghofl, 776 F2d 1034, 1038 (Fed Cir 1985).
8 See Electronic Design, 954 F2d at 715.
82 Sarah Coventry, Inc. v T. Sardelli & Sons, Inc., 392 F Supp 347, 354 (D RI 1975)
(emphasis in original).
82 15 USC § 1121(a) (permits appeal from district court decisions).
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eral Circuit's de novo approach to review of likelihood of confusion
and the clearly erroneous standard the district courts and other
circuits employ can thus influence litigants' forum choices. Fur-
thermore, although the broader authority of district court review
offers advantages to some parties, " this result seems to discourage
use of the Federal Circuit's special familiarity with trademark law.
IV. WHY CLEARLY ERRONEOUS REVIEW SHOULD BE THE UNIFORM
STANDARD
Although some commentators have argued that the process of
determining the appropriate standard of review for a mixed ques-
tion is as arbitrary as Humpty Dumpty's remark that "[t]he ques-
tion is which is to be master-that's all,"8 5 reasoned approaches to
the process exist. This Section first argues that de novo review of
likelihood of confusion determinations is not entirely consistent
with Supreme Court precedent. It contends that considerations of
judicial resource allocation, specified by the Supreme Court, weigh
heavily for clearly erroneous review. Second, the Section offers two
analogies to determinations in other areas of law that support
clearly erroneous review of likelihood of confusion determinations.
A. Allocational Considerations: Supreme Court Guidance
In allocating judicial resources, the Supreme Court has looked
not only at the nature of a particular inquiry, but also at the na-
ture of the legal interests involved. 6 The following subsections
consider how differences in the substantive law at issue and differ-
ences in the nature and complexity of particular inquries have af-
11 A Federal Circuit decision immediately affects only the registrability of the contested
mark. In a civil action in district court, however, parties may consolidate all the issues relat-
ing to the infringement. The district court not only determines the registrability of the
mark, 15 USC § 1119, but may also issue injunctions and award damages, costs, and attor-
neys' fees. 15 USC §§ 1114(2)(A), 1116, 1117. The efficiency benefits of permitting such
consolidation were factors that motivated the adoption of the non-exclusive jurisdiction pro-
vision. See Registration of Trademarks, Joint Hearings before the Committees on Patents
on S 2679, 68th Cong, 2d Sess 36-54, 76-84 (1925) (hearings on 15 USC § 1071 that indicate
congressional intent with respect to consolidation of issues in the district court).
85 Stephen A, Weiner, The Civil Non Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 Cal
L Rev 1020, 1022 n 17 (1967). Note that Humpty Dumpty's earlier statement might have
been even more appropriate: "When I use a word .... it means just what I choose it to
mean-neither more nor less." Lewis Carroll, The Annotated Alice: Alice's Adventures in
Wonderland & Through The Looking Glass 269 (C.N. Potter, 1960).
88 See, for example, Miller, 474 US at 109-118 (voluntariness of a confession is a legal
question meriting independent review in a federal habeas corpus proceeding).
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fected judgments about the appropriate allocation of appellate
resources.
1. The nature of the substantive law at issue.
A comparison between Pullman-Standard and Baumgartner v
United States81 illustrates how differences between the rights and
interests implicated by two disputes can shape the Court's deter-
mination about which standard of review, clearly erroneous or de
novo, appropriately allocates judicial resources in the appellate
courts. The Supreme Court's recent tendency has been to narrow
the scope of appellate review where the issues do not involve fun-
damental constitutional rights,8" and this seems to run contrary to
the continued de novo review of likelihood of confusion determina-
tions by some circuit courts. Although de novo review of likelihood
of confusion determinations does not directly conflict with any Su-
preme Court precedent,89 de novo review is at least inconsistent
with the tenor of some of the Court's jurisprudence.
a) Pullman-Standard, Baumgartner and the Distinction
Between Subsidiary and Ultimate Facts. In Pullman-Standard,
the Supreme Court held that a determination of intent to discrimi-
nate in a Title VII action is a finding of fact, and that appellate
courts must review all findings of fact, whether "subsidiary" or
"ultimate," under the clearly erroneous rule. 0 Before Pullman-
Standard, some appellate courts drew a distinction between sub-
sidiary and ultimate facts when reviewing particular likelihood of
confusion disputes.91 The distinction allowed an appellate court to
adhere to the clearly erroneous rule in reviewing the "subsidiary"
findings on each evidentiary factor, while reviewing de novo the
"ultimate" determination of likelihood of confusion.2 After Pull-
man-Standard, however, the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits
8 322 US 665 (1944).
88 See, for example, Pierce v Underwood, 487 US 552 (1988) (de novo review not availa-
ble on the question of whether United States' litigating position under the Equal Access to
Justice Act was substantially justified); Cooter & Gell v Hartmarx Corp., 496 US 384, 399-
405 (1990) (de novo review not available on imposition of Rule 11 sanctions).
88 The Court did not address in Pullman-Standard whether the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of FRCP 52(a) applies to mixed questions. See Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 289 n 19.
80 456 US at 287.
81 See, for example, Scott Paper Co. v Scott's Liquid Gold, 589 F2d 1225, 1229 n 3 (3d
Cir 1978).
02 Pizzeria Uno Corp. v Temple, 747 F2d 1522, 1526 (4th Cir 1984).
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expressly disavowed the approach." The Second, Sixth, and Fed-
eral Circuits' review of likelihood of confusion determinations em-
ploys a distinction nearly identical to the subsidiary/ultimate fact
distinction. These circuits treat the findings on the evidentiary fac-
tors as (subsidiary) factual findings, reversible only if clearly erro-
neous, but they review de novo the (ultimate) determination of
likelihood of confusion. These courts have been criticized for their
apparent inconsistency with Pullman-Standard.9 4
Although courts applying de novo review to likelihood of con-
fusion determinations have not addressed the implications of Pull-
man-Standard in their opinions,95 the omission might not consti-
tute indifference to Supreme Court precedent. It might simply
reflect their belief that the ultimate determination of whether con-
fusion is likely is a conclusion of law, not governed by the clearly
erroneous standard of FRCP 52(a), and therefore subject to de
novo review. 6 This approach relies on distinguishing fact from law,
rather than subsidiary fact from ultimate fact. The courts that still
apply de novo review to likelihood of confusion findings may,
therefore, read Pullman-Standard as leaving undisturbed the basis
of their likelihood of confusion decisions.
Two additional lines of analysis may distinguish Pullman-
Standard's holding. First, one could argue that because likelihood
of confusion is a mixed question,97 Pullman-Standard's reasoning
does not dictate the review standard. Second, one could argue that
the likelihood of confusion determination is less like Pullman-
13 See American Home Products, 834 F2d at 370 n 2; Pizzeria Uno, 747 F2d at 1526;
Scandia Down, 772 F2d at 1428.
" See, for example, Scandia Down, 772 F2d at 1428 ("The Supreme Court held ...
that Rule 52(a) does not permit any distinction between ordinary and 'ultimate' findings.
The Federal Circuit's cases do not discuss [Pullman-Standard v] Swint and we conclude
that they are inconsistent ... .
95 See id.
96 Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 287 ("The Rule does not apply to conclusions of
law.").
1, See text accompanying notes 64-69. The Court expressly stated that it did not ad-
dress whether the clearly erroneous standard applied to mixed questions. Pullman-Stan-
dard, 456 US at 289 n 19. The argument that Pullman-Standard does not dictate the
proper standard of review for likelihood of confusion disputes has further support in the
fact that Justice White authored the Court's opinion in Pullman-Standard, yet has dis-
sented from the Court's denial of certiorari to several likelihood of confusion cases. As one
cert petition pointed out, "it seems unlikely that Justice White would prescribe the remedy
of court intervention for a self-healing conflict." Reply Brief in Support of Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Euroquilt, Inc. v
Scandia Down Corp., No 85-1038 (October Term, 1985) at 2 (on file with U Chi L Rev).
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Standard than the distinction between subsidiary and ultimate
facts the Court recognized in Baumgartner v United States.
In Baumgartner, the issue was whether the lower court's find-
ings constituted the clear and convincing proof of fraud necessary
to justify a denaturalization decree. The Court treated the trial
court's finding that this standard of proof had been met as a find-
ing of ultimate fact."" When a court decides an ultimate fact, its
conclusion may be drawn from "the whole mass of evidence.""9 Be-
cause such conclusions may rest on the court's assessment of "falli-
ble evidence," the Court explained, a reviewing court may need to
appraise the strength of the entire body of evidence independently
in order to ensure the validity of the lower court's finding.100 Pull-
man-Standard distinguished this finding by reasoning that the
question whether the denaturalization decree was justified, unlike
the intent issue in a Title VII case, was not a pure finding of fact
but a finding that "clearly impl[ied] the application of standards of
law."10'
At first glance, Baumgartner's analysis provides support for
the Second, Sixth, and Federal Circuits' two-step approach to like-
lihood of confusion inquiries because the two approaches appear
quite similar. 10 2 For example, to determine whether confusion is
likely, a court must assess the entire body of evidence. However,
although Baumgartner is still good law after Pullman-Standard,
Baumgartner's context indicates that its reasoning should not be
construed to support de novo review of likelihood of confusion
determinations.
b) The Court's recent limitations on the use of de novo
review. In Baumgartner, the Court appears to have justified de
novo review on the ground that "the decision [at issue]... cannot
escape [] social judgments.' ' 0 3 The Court implied that because de-
naturalization decisions lie "close to opinions regarding the whole
nature of our Government and the duties and immunities of citi-
" 322 US at 670-71.
" Id at 671.
100 Id at 670-71.
... 456 US at 287 n 16, citing Baumgartner, 322 US at 671.
102 One commentator has suggested that, given the similarities between the two ap-
proaches, disapproval of the minority circuit's approach would require the explicit disavowal
of Baumgartner's reasoning. See Comment, Appellate Review of Lanham Act Violations: Is
Likelihood of Confusion a Question of Law or Fact?, 38 Sw L J 743, 766-67 (1984).
103 322 US at 671.
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zenship,' 10 4 they necessitate the thorough inquiry independent ap-
pellate review affords. Denaturalization decisions implicate impor-
tant social judgments and have the potential to deny constitutional
rights, privileges, and immunities. The Court deemed de novo nec-
essary to ensure just decisions and protect fundamental liberties.10 5
As Baumgartner implied and subsequent Court precedent in-
dicates, the need for de novo review "varies according to the na-
ture of the substantive law at issue."106 Fact-specific determina-
tions implicating fundamental constitutional liberties are likely to
warrant de novo review. 07 For example, in Ker v California, the
Court stated that reasonableness determinations under the Fourth
Amendment receive de novo review even though such determina-
tions rest on the facts and circumstances of each case. 08 On review
the mixed question of probable cause is treated, therefore, as a
question of law. Similarly, in Bose Corp. v Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., the Court held that appellate courts should
review de novo, as a question of law, proof of actual malice in a
libel case-despite such fact-specific issues as the scienter
element. 0 9
When a case implicates a constitutional right, the application
of law to fact often requires a court to consider the law regarding
the relevant constitutional provision. In both Ker and Bose, for ex-
ample, the holdings implicitly recognized that the inquiries in-
volved in applying the legal standards-probable cause and actual
malice-go beyond the facts and require the court to consider ab-
stract legal principles that inform constitutional jurisprudence. 10
The need for de novo review, therefore, increases where constitu-
tional rights are involved. The Court emphasized in both cases the
appellate court's duty to review independently the record in mat-
ters involving fundamental constitutional rights to ensure that the
lower courts' decisions are consistent with principles of constitu-
tional law and do not infringe upon fundamental liberties."'
A similar constitutionally-based interest in independent re-
view of likelihood of confusion determinations does not exist in
10 Id.
10 See Bose, 466 US at 510-11.
.06 Id at 501 n 17.
107 Baumgartner, 322 US at 671. See also Bose, 466 US at 510-11.
106 374 US 23, 33-34 (1963).
10. 466 US 485, 510-11 (1984) (libel implicates the First Amendment).
01 See McConney, 728 F2d at 1203.
See Ker, 374 US at 33-34; Bose, 466 US at 499-511. See also New York Times Co. v
Sullivan, 376 US 254, 284-86 (1964).
1308 [59:1291
Trademark Law
trademark law. Supreme Court cases involving trademark law have
not indicated that the interests implicated warrant de novo re-
view.'12 Because fundamental constitutional liberties are not at
stake in trademark disputes, appellate courts lack justification for
de novo review of likelihood of confusion determinations. Although
Pullman-Standard does not preclude the continued de novo re-
view of likelihood of confusion determinations, the de novo ap-
proach here ignores the lesson implied by a comparison of Pull-
man-Standard and Baumgartner and its successors: de novo
review of fact-specific inquiries is necessary only when the case im-
plicates fundamental constitutional rights or consequential social
values.
2. Considerations of the nature and complexity of the inquiry
in allocating judicial resources.
Although the practices of some circuits indicate that courts
can independently evaluate issues relevant to likelihood of confu-
sion, this independent evaluation does not establish that de novo
review promotes judicial accuracy or the efficient use of appellate
resources. In Salve Regina College v Russell,"3 a recent standard
of review decision, the Supreme Court discussed the advantages of
de novo review and the types of inquiries that warrant it. The
Court stated that independent appellate review of legal issues
serves two policy goals: doctrinal coherence and economy of judi-
cial administration.'14 The Court explained that the logistical bur-
dens of trial advocacy frequently limit the extent to which trial
counsel can supplement the district court's legal research with
memoranda and briefs. As a result, "trial judges often must resolve
complicated legal questions without benefit of 'extended reflection
[or] extensive information.' "11" The Court stated that deferential
review of mixed questions is warranted when it appears that the
district court is in a better position to determine the issue than the
appellate court and "probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute
to the clarity of legal doctrine."" 86
" See, for example, Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 US 844,
855 (1982) (findings underlying the district court's determination that manufacturers of a
generic drug could not be held liable for trademark infringement by pharmacists who misla-
beled the generic drug with a competitor's registered trademark were not clearly erroneous).
M, 111 S Ct 1217, 1221 (1991) (de novo review of federal district court interpretations
of state law questions is appropriate).
114 Id.
115 Id.
1 Id at 1222.
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Unlike the matter at issue in Salve Regina College, the inter-
pretation of state law by federal courts, trademark infringement
suits do not require resolution of complex legal questions. "Reflec-
tive dialogue and collective judgment" 117 are not necessary to de-
termine the state of the law concerning likelihood of confusion.
Rather, the legal standard is well defined and the trial court must
apply the facts to that existing legal standard. Further, because
trademark cases usually involve sophisticated parties (who are
more likely to employ sophisticated attorneys), the trial briefs and
memoranda will more likely provide sufficient guidance to a trial
judge unfamiliar with trademark law.
To reduce the risk of judicial error, the court in the superior
position to evaluate and weigh the evidence should have the pri-
mary responsibility for resolving predominately fact-based dis-
putes.118 As the trier of fact, the district court or the TTAB is in
the superior position. Clearly erroneous review would help con-
serve appellate resources for issues that the appellate courts are
better situated to decide. The need for de novo review of likelihood
of confusion determinations is further reduced because these de-
terminations have little significance beyond the immediate dispute.
Appellate resources should not, therefore, be allocated to the re-
examination of fact-specific issues that can be determined with the
same, or nearly the same, degree of consistency at the trial level."'
B. Analogous Determinations in Other Areas of Law
Analogies to similar inquiries in other areas of the law are use-
ful in determining whether a particular mixed question should be
treated as fact or law for review purposes. This Section analogizes
the likelihood of confusion determination to both the reasonable
royalty standard for damage award determinations in patent in-
fringement cases and the negligence determination in tort actions.
Because courts accord clearly erroneous review to both of these de-
terminations, courts should likewise review likelihood of confusion
as a factual issue subject to the clearly erroneous standard.
" Id at 1221.
"8 Zenith Radio Corp. v Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 US 100, 123 (1969).
.. Anderson v Bessemer City, 470 US 564, 574-75 (1985) (appellate courts must defer
to trial court's findings based on documentary evidence and on inferences drawn from other
facts). As the Court stated in Miller v Fenton: "[various] considerations often suggest the
appropriateness of resolving close questions concerning the status of an issue as one of 'law'
or 'fact' in favor of extending deference to the trial court." 474 US 104, 114 (1985).
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1. The reasonable royalty standard.
Both the likelihood of confusion determination in trademark
law and the reasonable royalty rule in patent law protect intellec-
tual property rights. Trademark law and patent law grant exclusive
use of intangible property and protect that property against misap-
propriation. Both trademark and patent infringement are commer-
cial torts.2 '
The reasonable royalty standard is a means to determine dam-
ages in patent infringement cases when actual damages, such as
lost profits, cannot be determined. 121 A reasonable royalty is an
amount that a person who wants to manufacture and sell a pat-
ented article for a profit would be willing to pay as a royalty.122 As
in likelihood of confusion determinations, the reasonable royalty
determination is based on a legal fiction.121 In likelihood of confu-
sion determinations, the legal fiction is a hypothetical consumer,
the "ordinarily prudent purchaser." In reasonable royalty determi-
nations, the legal fiction consists of two hypothetical parties nego-
tiating a royalty. The parties are assumed to be reasonable busi-
nesspersons willing to enter into a licensing agreement. To
establish the damage award, the court determines the rate that a
willing licensor and a willing licensee would have negotiated at the
time of the first infringement.12 4
Because the likelihood of confusion determination depends on
the general impression of the average consumer, rather than a side-
by-side comparison of the marks, the trier of fact needs to consider
and weigh various evidentiary factors to determine how the aver-
age consumer would perceive and recollect the marks. Similarly, in
reasonable royalty determinations, courts will consider a number
of different evidentiary factors depending on the circumstances of
the infringement. 2 5 Using the willing licensor-willing licensee con-
struct, a court weighs and balances findings from these factors to
determine the appropriate damage amount. The legal fiction rests
on the assumption that the parties are prudent businesspersons
120 Railex Corp. v Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 FRD 119, 124-25 (D DC 1966).
M See Panduit Corp. v Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F2d 1152, 1157, 1157 n 1
(6th Cir 1978), citing 35 USC § 284.
122 Id at 1157-58.
123 Id at 1159.
124 Stickle v Heublein, Inc., 716 F2d 1550, 1561 (Fed Cir 1983).
120 The factors relevant to the hypothetical negotiation were articulated in Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v United States Plywood Corp., 318 F Supp 1116, 1120 (S D NY 1970). See
also Panduit Corp., 575 F2d at 1162.
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who would reach a royalty reasonable to both;12 6 that is, the deter-
mination is based on the interests of the hypothetical parties,
rather than what the court perceives as just.
The similarity of the evidentiary factors used in making the
two determinations suggests the similarity of the two inquiries.
The nature of the patented invention and the distinctiveness of a
mark are significant, 127 as is the extent to which the plaintiff has
used the mark or the device.12s A court in a patent case may look
at the extent to which the licensor has a policy to maintain the
patent monopoly.12 9 Similarly, a court in a trademark case looks at
whether a senior user has actively protected its interests in the
mark. 3 1 In both instances, courts consider whether the senior user
or the licensor monitors the trade and enforces his or her interests
against apparent infringers. Finally, in both inquiries, a court may
consider the extent to which the parties compete with one an-
other'3 ' and the infringer's intent. 2
In addition to being structurally and substantively similar, the
two inquiries share functional similarities. Both determinations re-
quire a court to make a highly fact-specific inquiry based on the
relevant evidentiary factors. 133 Further, both determinations fre-
quently require courts to evaluate conflicting testimonial and docu-
mentary evidence on disputed issues and make credibility determi-
nations.134  To reach conclusions, courts must exercise their
discretion and weigh the evidentiary factors in a manner consistent
with the controlling legal fiction and the circumstances of the case.
128 Panduit Corp., 575 F2d at 1158-59.
27 Miss World (UK) Ltd. v Mrs. America Pageants, Inc., 856 F2d 1445, 1448-50 (9th
Cir 1988) (trademark); Polaroid Corp. v Eastman Kodak Co., 16 USPQ2d 1481, 1490-91 (D
Mass 1990) (patent).
12' Keds Corp. v Renee International Trading Corp., 888 F2d 215, 222 (1st Cir 1989)
(trademark); Ziggity Systems, Inc. v Val Watering Systems, 769 F Supp 752, 827 (E D Pa
1990) (patent).
1' Andrew Corp. v Gabriel Electronics, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 2701, *30 (D Maine
1992).
130 Plus Products v Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir 1983).
,' General Mills, Inc. v Kellogg Co., 824 F2d 622, 627-28 (8th Cir 1987) (trademark);
Rite-Hite Corp. v Kelley Co., Inc., 774 F Supp 1514, 1543 (E D Wis 1991) (patent).
"I Century 21 Real Estate Corp v Sandlin, 846 F2d 1175, 1179-80 (9th Cir 1988)
(trademark); Fromson v Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 13 USPQ2d 1856, 1861-62 (E
D Mo 1989) (patent).
133 Eclipse Associates Ltd. v Data General Corp., 894 F2d 1114, 1116-18 (9th Cir 1990)
(trademark); Panduit Corp., 575 F2d at 1159 (patent); American Original Corp. v Jenkins
Food Corp., 774 F2d 459, 462-63 (Fed Cir 1985) (patent).
131 Scandia Down, 772 F2d at 1428-31 (trademark); American Original, 774 F2d at 462,
464 (patent).
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Both determinations depend more on the facts and circumstances
of each specific case than on a legal standard.'35
Damage awards based on reasonable royalty determinations
are reviewed as findings of fact under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard.3 6 From functional and allocational perspectives, it would be
consistent for appellate courts also to adhere to the clearly errone-
ous standard when reviewing lower court determinations of likeli-
hood of confusion, thus deferring to the trier of fact, the deci-
sionmaker most familiar with a case's facts and circumstances.
2. Negligence.
Negligence and likelihood of confusion are both standards for
determining liability. Liability rests on conduct that unreasonably
interferes with the interests of others. In negligence, a party
breaches a duty of reasonable care. In trademark infringement, a
party breaches a duty not to cause or create consumer confusion.
In both determinations, a court's conclusion rests on a legal fiction.
In both negligence and trademark infringement, the wide vari-
ety of potential situations makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
develop specific standards or rules in advance for all situations. As
a result, the trier of fact applies a reasonable person standard,
based on a person of ordinary skills using ordinary care. In likeli-
hood of confusion disputes, the issue is whether the allegedly in-
fringing mark will confuse "an appreciable number of ordinarily
prudent purchasers.' 13 In negligence determinations, the question
is what an ordinary but prudent person would think it reasonable
to do under the circumstances of the case. 8" In both determina-
tions, the legal standard is fact-specific; the court's final conclusion
in negligence cases depends on the facts of the case, construed in
accordance with the reasonable person standard.
As in the likelihood of confusion inquiry, the negligence in-
quiry presents a mixed question whose resolution requires fact
identification, law declaration, and law application. 39 Negligence
determinations require a court to articulate the standard of care
against which the defendant's conduct must be measured and to
I Panduit Corp., 575 F2d at 1159 ("The amount of a reasonable royalty after infringe-
ment turns on the facts of each case, as best they may be determined.").
136 Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v Helena Laboratories Corp., 926 F2d 1161, 1164 n 2
(Fed Cir 1991).
'17 Perini Corp., 915 F2d at 127.
"I Deguio v U.S., 920 F2d 103, 105-06 (1st Cir 1990).
119 McConney, 728 F2d at 1200.
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apply that standard of care to evidentiary fact-findings. The stan-
dard of care is the legal standard in the case and defines what obli-
gations exist between the parties. Most frequently, the applicable
standard is a duty of reasonable care as defined by community
norms.140 Because the legal standard is based on "data of practical
human experience," the trial court's findings of evidentiary fact ef-
fectively determine the negligence question.141
Negligence is a mixed question of law and fact 2 and all fed-
eral courts of appeal, except the Second Circuit, treat it as a ques-
tion of fact subject to clearly erroneous review.143 Clearly erroneous
review of negligence determinations is consistent with the deferen-
tial review standard the Supreme Court has accorded to other
mixed questions that do not implicate fundamental constitutional
rights or significant social judgments, determinations in which rea-
sonableness plays a significant role.14 4
The justification for clearly erroneous review in likelihood of
confusion cases transcends the justification for this standard in
cases of negligence. The legal standard used in negligence determi-
nations is more amorphous than the legal standard in likelihood of
confusion cases. Negligence determinations rest on the reasonable
person -construct alone, rather than, as in likelihood of confusion
inquiries, on the reasonable person construct and articulated evi-
dentiary factors. The legal standard in negligence cases provides
little specific guidance as to what is reasonable. The meaning of
the standard, therefore, can vary greatly because a variety of judg-
ments as to what is reasonable are socially acceptable. As an allo-
cational matter, if the clearly erroneous standard. governs the re-
view of negligence determinations, the standard should also govern
likelihood of confusion determinations, where the applicable legal
standard is less ambiguous.
140 McConney, 728 F2d at 1204.
141 Id.
142 Barnett v Sea Land Service, Inc., 875 F2d 741, 745 (9th Cir 1989).
141 See James Win. Moore and Jo Desha Lucas, 5A Moore's Federal Practice 52.05[1],
52-102 (Bender, 2d ed 1992). The Second Circuit reviews negligence determinations de novo
because it believes that the only way a reviewing court can determine whether the standard
of care has been formulated correctly is to review freely the application of the legal standard
to the established facts. Mamiye Bros. v Barber S.S. Lines, Inc., 360 F2d 774, 776-78 (2d Cir
1966).
' See, for example, Cooter & Gell, 496 US at 405 (appellate courts should employ an
abuse of discretion standard when reviewing all aspects of a district court's decision in a
Rule 11 proceeding because the legal standard is highly fact-dependent).
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CONCLUSION
Determinations of likelihood of confusion in trademark cases
are predominately factual in nature and well suited to clearly erro-
neous review. Treating likelihood of confusion as a question of fact
for review purposes accords with the Supreme Court's standard of
review jurisprudence and is supported by analogous determina-
tions in other areas of law. As the Court stated in a case involving
contributory trademark infringement, the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of FRCP 52(a) "recognizes and rests upon the unique oppor-
tunity afforded the trial judge to evaluate the credibility of wit-
nesses and to weigh the evidence."145 The trier of fact, as the
decisionmaker most familiar with the circumstances and the facts
of an alleged trademark infringement, is better positioned than the
appellate court to determine whether an infringement has occurred
under a likelihood of confusion theory. An appellate court should
defer to the fact finder's judgments on this issue unless, after con-
sidering all the evidence, the court is "left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. '146 In the in-
terests of doctrinal coherence, judicial accuracy and efficiency, and
the prevention of forum shopping, the clearly erroneous rule
should become the uniform standard for reviewing likelihood of
confusion determinations.
Inwood Laboratories, 456 US at 855.
146 United States v U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 US 364, 395 (1948). See also Anderson, 470
US at 573. If, however, the lower court applied an incorrect or incomplete test to determine
likelihood of confusion, the lower court's fact findings and determination of likelihood of
confusion should lose the shield of the clearly erroneous standard, and the determination of
likelihood of confusion, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, should be
reviewed de novo or remanded.
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